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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 10-4671 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
v. 
 
FRANKLIN XAVIER, 
 
       Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-08-cr-00018-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Raymond L. Finch 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 10, 2012 
 
BEFORE: CHAGARES, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion Filed:  May 25, 2012) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge.    
In a bifurcated trial, a jury convicted appellant of unauthorized possession of a 
firearm and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) 
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and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), respectively. On appeal, defendant raises several issues, each 
of which is discussed in turn. Because we find no error, we will affirm. 
Appellant’s arguments are raised for the first time on appeal and, therefore, are 
reviewed for plain error. Plain error requires the error to (i)  be obvious under current law 
and (ii) “affect[] substantial rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
734-35 (1993).  
 (1)  Appellant argues that the court erred by allowing into evidence testimony 
from the government’s witness, appellant’s ex-wife, Ms. Xavier, that she was afraid of 
appellant, appellant was on probation, appellant had threatened to shoot her, and 
appellant was not afraid to use his gun. Defense counsel, not the government, elicited this 
testimony during the voir dire of Ms. Xavier to determine her competency for laying a 
foundation for the admission of the subject firearm. After eliciting this testimony, defense 
counsel did not object.  
 This testimony was invited by appellant’s trial counsel’s voir dire of the witness. 
Because invited error cannot be the basis for reversal, United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 
641, 660 (3d Cir. 1993), any error in admitting this evidence is not “obvious under 
current law.” As a result, its admission does not constitute plain error and it cannot be a 
basis for reversal of appellant’s conviction. 
 (2)  Appellant next argues that the court committed reversible error by stating to 
the defense counsel in front of the jury “If you get into it, remember my admonition . . . 
I’ll allow the whole ball of wax to come in.” The court’s statement was based on a 
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mistaken assumption that that defense counsel was pursuing questions of the 
government’s witness regarding a firearm seized from the witness’s car on January 25, 
2008. The court had previously ruled that pursuing that line of questioning would allow 
the admission of all evidence about that firearm. The government concedes that this was 
error, but argues that it did not affect appellant’s substantial rights and, therefore, was not 
plain error. We agree. 
First, any prejudice that resulted from this admonition was minimal. The comment 
only suggested that there was other evidence; that evidence was never indentified and the 
court’s comment had no context from which the jury could draw an inference since the 
jury was not privy to the previous ruling. Additionally, the defense focused on the 
credibility of Ms. Xavier. This comment did not relate to or raise the issue of her 
credibility.  
Furthermore, in response to appellant’s request during the charging conference 
that a curative instruction be given in regards to the court’s “ball of wax” comment, the 
parties agreed on and the court gave the following instruction: 
Further, any questions that I may have asked, any comment that I may have 
made to counsel, and any act that I may have done during this trial is not 
evidence . . . . if by chance you consider anything I may have said or 
anything I may have done as an admonishment, you are to draw absolutely 
no inference against the side to whom such admonishment may have been 
addressed during the course of this trial. 
 
(JA 288, 312-13.)  
In light of the lack of materiality of the comment and the curative instruction, 
there was no plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Olgin, 745 F.2d 263, 268-70 (3d Cir. 
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1984).  
 (3)  Appellant argues that the court committed plain error by admitting evidence 
that appellant had previously brandished a gun at a gas station and fired three shots in 
response to a comment from another person. Prior to trial, the court held that the evidence 
was admissible because it was inextricably intertwined with the events surrounding the 
charged crime. At trial, Ms. Xavier testified that on January 25, 2008 she drove a vehicle 
to a gas station where appellant fired a gun, the same one retrieved from appellant’s 
home. Appellant did not object to the testimony during trial.  
 The government needed to show the firearm’s operability and appellant’s 
constructive possession of the firearm. Evidence that he physically possessed the firearm 
and fired it in the past, therefore, directly proves the charged crime. United States v. 
Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In closing, the government highlighted 
this evidence as proof of these elements of the crime, not as proof of character. Further, 
the court instructed the jury that “. . . you are to consider only the offense charged and 
you are not to base your decision on any act or any conduct that is not specifically 
charged in this indictment.” 
 As a result, it is not “obvious under current law” that this evidence is irrelevant to 
prove appellant’s intent or the firearm’s operability as required by the statute or that it is 
unduly prejudicial, particularly in light of the limiting instruction. Because there is no 
plain error in its admission, appellant’s conviction will not be reversed on this basis. 
 (4)  Appellant also argues that the court committed reversible error by 
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disclosing to the jury the general character of appellant’s prior felony convictions. 
Following the jury’s guilty verdict on the firearm possession charge, the parties stipulated 
regarding appellant’s prior convictions. The parties’ stipulation states, in relevant part, 
that appellant had been “convicted of the following felony offenses:  . . . crimes of 
attempted murder, possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, assault in the third 
degree, and felon in possession of a firearm. . . .” (JA 377.) During the second phase of 
the trial, after appellant was found guilty of unauthorized possession of a firearm without 
admission of prior convictions, the trial court read the entire stipulation to the jury. No 
party objected. (JA 353-54.) The trial court also read the remaining felon in possession 
charge from the indictment. The felon in possession charge named the crimes in the 
stipulation. 
The trial court instructed the jury on how to use evidence of prior convictions: 
When attorneys on both sides stipulate or agree to the existence of a fact, 
you may accept the stipulation as evidence, and regard that fact as having 
been proved. You are not required to do so, however, since your are the 
sole judges of the facts. You have heard the evidence through a stipulation 
that the defendant was convicted before this incident in the District of the 
Virgin Islands and in the District of the Southern District of Illinois of 
crimes punishable by imprisonment exceeding – for a term exceeding one 
year. These prior convictions were brought to your attention only because 
they tend to establish one of the elements of the crime of possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon as set forth in the indictment. 
 
You are not to speculate as to the nature of these convictions. You may not 
consider these two prior convictions in deciding whether Franklin Xavier 
was in knowing possession of a firearm that he’s charged in this case with 
possession –which is an issue which you have already decided. 
 
(JA 354-55.)  
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 Evidence of prior offenses, including the names of the offenses for which 
appellant was convicted, was relevant to prove an element of the charged offense. Old 
Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 178-79 (1997). Nevertheless, “evidence of the name 
or nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” 
Id. at 185.  
Here, it is not “obvious under current law” that evidence of the names of 
appellant’s prior offenses was unfairly prejudicial to appellant. Nevertheless, even if 
there was error, it did not affect appellant’s substantial rights.  For phase two of the trial, 
appellant had stipulated to his felon status and the interstate travel of the firearm; the only 
other issue was whether appellant was in possession. But the jury had already found 
appellant guilty of unauthorized possession of a firearm without knowledge of his prior 
convictions during phase one of the trial. The jury’s verdict in phase one established that 
they believed there was sufficient evidence for possession. They would have convicted 
him of possession in phase two without any additional evidence. And during phase two 
no additional evidence, aside from the prior convictions, was presented. The district 
court’s instruction to use this evidence of prior convictions for the issue of whether he 
was a felon further ensured that appellant’s substantial rights would not be affected. As a 
result, there is no plain error. 
 (5)  Finally, appellant argues that the court improperly enhanced appellant’s 
sentence for violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) because the government did not fulfill the 
procedural requirements of 14 V.I.C. § 62. At sentencing, the court imposed 15 years for 
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unauthorized possession of a firearm, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a), and 10 years for 
possession by a felon, to be served concurrently. The defendant did not raise the issue 
that the government did not comply with Section 62(a) in its pre-sentencing brief about 
the applicability of the 15-year sentencing provision. (JA 5-17.) He also did not raise the 
issue at his sentencing. 
There is no plain error in the district court’s imposition of an enhanced sentence 
for appellant’s violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a). It is not “obvious under current law” that 
the criterion for sentence enhancement in 14 V.I.C. § 62 are applicable to sentence 
enhancement for a violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a). Section 2253 is a separate section of 
the statute from 14 V.I.C. § 62, pertains specifically to firearms possession, and provides 
its own criterion for sentence enhancement. 
Furthermore, Xavier received ample notice that he faced an enhanced sentence 
under Section 2253(a). The enhancement was mentioned in the Pre-Sentence Report, 
which also listed appellant’s prior convictions. Additionally, the trial court ordered both 
parties to brief the issue of whether the 15-year sentencing provision applied to appellant. 
(JA 30, Dkt. No. 272.) In light of these facts, a due process violation is not “obvious 
under current law.” United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2000). There is 
no plain error in imposing the sentence enhancement.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court 
entered on December 8, 2010. 
